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NOTE
NORTH DAKOTA WATER LAW:
A CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON
The riparian system and the appropriation system of water law
have long been recognized as the two major systems of water law
in this country. The basic tenet of the riparian system is that the
landholder has certain vested legal rights in waters appurtenant to
his land. On the other hand, the appropriation system provides
that a prior appropriator of water has the better right to the water
even if a subsequent riparian tries to appropriate this same water
which is appurtenant to his land. While keeping this over-simpli-
fied distinction of the two systems in mind, it is proposed that a
recently enacted statute dealing with the regulation and use of water
in the state of North Dakota may present an important consitu-
tional question in the near future.
The underlying problem has arisen from the legislative policy
which has determined that the common law riparian system of
water law is no longer suitable to the conditions now existing in
North Dakota. The legislature has attempted, by means of a series
of statutory enactments, to change the riparian system as it was
recognized to have existed and in its place set up an appropriation
system of water law.,
North Dakota is not the first state to deal with the problem
of change in its basic water law. It is proposed that an examina-
tion of this state's present statutory and case law in comparison with
the Kansas and South Dakota experience with this problem will be
of substantial benefit in determining the resolution of problems that
will, in all probability, be encountered in the application of the
present North Dakota statutes.
The basic problem which is to be dealt with herein is whether
or not the present North Dakota statutes provide adequate pro-
tection of existing property rights as they have been recognized to
exist by past statutory and case law.
The riparian system was codified in North Dakota by the statu-
1. See Larsen, The Development of Water Rights and Suggested Improvements in
the Water Law of North Dakota, 38 N.D.L. Rev. 243 (1962).
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tory provisions adopted by the Territorial Legislature in 1866.
These provisions established the riparian's right to use water running
in a natural watercourse. 2 An 1881 statute which was later in-
cluded in the North Dakota Constitution, further limited any
"ownership" which a riparian may have believed he had in waters
running in a natural watercourse appurtenant to his land. It pro-
vided that "all flowing streams and natural watercourses shall
forever remain the property of the state for mining, irrigating and
manufacturing purposes."
A major change in North Dakota's water laws took place in
1905. These statues, as amended, remain in force today. One
statute declares all waters within the state from virtually all sources
of supply belong to the public and are subject to appropriation for
beneficial use.4  This declaration of public ownership of waters
is an important concept in establishing an appropriation system.
The present statutes itemize a system of priorities and declare
that as between appropriators for the same use, priority in time
shall give the better right. 5 Prior appropriation for beneficial use
gives such an appropriator the better right to the use of the
water.6 Eminent domain is available when necessary for the ap-
plication of water to beneficial uses which constitute a public
purpose.7 A failure to use water for purposes for which it was
appropriated for a period of three years, results in a reversion of
the water to the public and it may again be appropriated. The
administration of the loss of water rights is placed in the hands of
the state engineer.8
It can thus far be recognized that the above statutory presenta-
tion goes far to establish the basic premises of an appropriation
system of water law. It is equally apparent that thus far no men-
tion has been made as to how present owners of water rights are
to be treated. Section 61-04-22 purports to deal with these rights. 9
It provides that anyone beneficially appropriating water twenty
years prior to July 1, 1963, has two years from that date to regis-
ter an application to protect this right. Failure to apply for a
permit results in abandonment and forfeiture of the prescriptive
right. It should be noted that this section does not deal with water
users who may have begun their appropriation within the tweny
year period. This section was enacted in 1963 and at the same time
the statute providing the basis for the riparian's right to use water
2. TERR. DAK. CIV. CODE § 255 (1866).
3. N.D. CONST. art. 17, § 210.
4. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1960) specifically excludes "privately owned waters,
in areas determined by the state engineer to be noncontributing drainage areas," and
"difused surface waters."
5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (1960).
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-02 (1960).
7. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-04 (1960).
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-23 (1960).
9. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-22 (1960).
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was repealed. 10 It is important to note that Section 61-04-22 recog-
nizes only those existing water rights which are prescriptive in
nature. Nowhere do the statutes mention prior vested rights nor
in any way do they purport to recognize or protect them.
An early case" recognized the reasonable use doctrine of
riparian rights and the vesting of legally protected water rights
in the riparian landowner. The court stated that once the govern-
ment no longer owns a tract of land, the right of the subsequent
riparian owner attaches, and cannot thereafter be invaded. It
would seem then, that the United States Supreme Court recognized
that it was possible to acquire a vested right in water under the
riparian system which would be protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. It
might be argued that Section 61-04-22 has the effect of divesting
these previously recognized vested water rights which a riparian
may have had should he fail to apply for a permit within the two
year statutory period.
The real question is whether the 1963 statute adequately pro-
tects prior vested water rights. Stated another way, the question
is whether or not a statute which provides that those who have
prior vested water rights must affirmatively protect those rights
by obtaining a permit under the new statutory system and declar
ing those who fail to do so as having abandoned and forfeited any
right they may have had, adequately satisfied the due process re-
quirement as a constitutional application of the state's police power.
Kansas has recently enacted an appropriation system as opposed
to its prior recognition of the riparian system. These statues have
successfully endured the constitutional test. An inspection of the
Kansas appropriation statutes readily reveals that there was great
concern over the protection of prior vested water rights. The
statutes define vested rights as the right to continue the use of
water which had actually been applied to a beneficial use at the
time of the passage of the statute or within three years prior there-
to.1 2 It is clearly stated that any appropriation made under the
provision of the statutes is subject to vested rights. 13 At the same
time all water within the state is dedicated to the use of the people
of the state.
14
The most important aspect of the Kansas appropriation statutes
in comparing them with the procedure set out by the North Dakota
statutes is that the burden is on the Kansas chief engineer to gath-
er data in order to determine which vested rights were in existence
10. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-13, repealed by N.D. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 419, § 7.
11. Sturr v. Beck, 133 U.S. 641 (1890). See also Bigelow v. Draper, 6 N.D. 152, 69
N.W. 570 (1896).
12. K.AN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701 (Supp. 1961).
13. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703 (1949).
14. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (1949).
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at the time the statute was enacted." Once the determination is
made, all such water users must be notified of the findings and
they have the right to appeal such findings if they disagree with
them. 16 The Kansas statutes do not require the holders of prior
vested rights to act in any way to protect those rights, but it is
provided that such holders may have a right of action should their
rights be invaded.17 Before any water rights can be declared
abandoned, the holder of such rights must be notified and given
a chance to show cause why his right should not be forfeited. 8
The Supreme Court of Kansas 9 was quick to recognize that
the correct approach to water rights must be based upon the best
interests of the people of the state, but also emphasized the fact
that the individual's right to use water must not be disregarded.
The court also stated that prior decisions recognizing certain rights
of riparians are no longer to be considered as precedent. This
would seem to mean that a new riparian user of water could not
claim that riparian rights were still in force based upon old case
law which recognized such rights. But this is not to say that ripar-
ian rights which had vested prior to the enactment of the new
statutes are now null and void.
The leading case 20 upholding the constitutionality of the Kansas
statutes stated that the state legislature did indeed have the power
to implement a new system of water law which would be better
suited to the conditions of the state. This power is based upon the
principle that an adequate water supply is necessary for the pub-
lic welfare.2 ' The court made it clear, however, that such a
system must adequately recognize valid existing vested rights.
Such rights were held to apply only to waters which had been put
to a beneficial use and not to unused waters. A later case reaffirmed
these principles and again stated that recognized rights under the
common law riparian system must be protected against subsequent
appropriators under the appropriation statutes.
22
The South Dakota appropriation statutes provide that the vested
rights of riparian owners to continue the use of waters actually put
to a beneficial use at the time of the passage of the statutes must
be protected.23 The statutes follow the Kansas scheme by provid-
ing that the public has a paramount interest in the water.2 4 The
South Dakota water commission is empowered to require reports
15. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-704 (Supp. 1961).
16. Ibid.
17. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-716 (Supp. 1961).
18. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-718 (Supp. 1961).
19. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440 (1949).
20. Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 863 (1956).
21. Ibid.
22. Williams v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d 578 (1962).
23. S.D. COD § 61.0-102 (Supp. 1960).
24. S.D. CoDs § 61.0101 (Supp. 1960).
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or other information from claimants of water rights.25 This seems
to imply that some request for such information from the claimant
must be made by the commission. As is true with the Kansas
statutes, South Dakota has made extensive provisions for the pro-
tection of vested rights.26 Before an appropriator under the statutes
may acquire any right to use water, he must give notice in the
area that he plans to take the water.27 Provisions are available
for a hearing so that all interested parties may have adequate op-
portunity to show that granting the appropriator's application would
be an invasion of their existing water rights.
2
The Supreme Court of South Dakota upheld the statutes as
being constitutional even though it recognized that there was some
invasion of pre-existing rights, but this applied only to rights in
water not then being put to beneficial use.2 9 It is probable that
this would not be a problem in North Dakota since this state has
already recognized the doctrine of. beneficial use.80 The South
Dakota Supreme Court used substantially the same language as did
the Kansas Courts in meeting the constitutional question. It held
that it was not shown that the statutes were unreasonable or
arbitrary."1
At this point it should be clear that Kansas and South Dakota
have taken a somewhat different approach in setting up their re-
spective appropriation systems than has North Dakota. The theme
of the Kansas and South Dakota statutes seems to be an apparent
desire to define and protect prior existing vested rights, while the
.North Dakota statutes almost completely ignore the very existence
of such rights. The North Dakota Legislature has made an attempt
to superimpose an appropriation system upon the state's former
riparian system while taking little cognizance of the effect of such
an act upon rights acquired under the riparian system. The only
provision for the protection of prior rights is the reference to
prescriptive rights and these rights do not seem to be recognized as
becoming vested until a permit has been obtained. And further, any
prescriptive right not registered by July 1, 1965, will be deemed
to have been abandoned and forfeited."
Even if the statutes do not recognize prior water rights as
being vested, it seems to be evident that the purpose of the statutes,
especially Section 61-04-22, is to regulate the use and enjoyment
of a property right for the public benefit. This is an employment
of the state's police power.88 It cannot be denied that the use
25. S.D. Coou § 61.0104 (Supp. 1960).
26. S.D. Cona §J 61.0106, 61.0137, 61.0401, 61.0403 (Supp. 1960).
27. S.D. CODE § 61.0112 (Supp. 1960).
28. S.D. CODE 1 61.0113 (Supp. 1960).
29. Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708 (S.D. 1964).
0. Sturr v. Bedk, 183 U.S. 541 (1890). See also note 1, supra.
31. Knight v. Grimes, supra note 29.
32. N.D. Csru. COD § 61-04-22 (1960).
33. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933).
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of the police power by a state for such a purpose is proper.8 4
The weight of authority is that a state may use its police
power to regulate property rights as long as such a use of the
police power is not repugnant to some constitutional guarantee. 5
The real question concerning the constitutionality of the North
Dakota statutes as affecting this particular area is whether or not
the state has properly used its police power. In applying the
accepted qualifications to the proper use of the police power, the
question is further narrowed to one of reasonableness.3
6
If it is conceded that the courts have no right to interfere with
the legislative determination of a policy which provides that all
waters of the state must be conserved, then it follows that a pros-
pective claimant of prior vested water rights must argue that the
legislature has not properly exercised its police power in seeking
to carry out its policy. This argument is in effect one that the
present statutes will unreasonably deprive owners of their prior
vested riparian water rights without due process of law.
The lesson to be learned from the South Dakota and Kansas
experience in this area is that there exists an alternative method
to North Dakota's two year registration requirement. Since this
alternative method goes further to protect prior vested rights, it
could be argued that the present North Dakota statute must give
way to it. It is likely that if the burden was put upon the state
engineer to determine the prior rights existing at the time of the
passage of the statute, this would offer much more protection to
owners of prior vested rights than does the present statute which
summarily declares all prescriptive water rights to be abandoned
and forfeited after July 1, 1965, if no permit has been obtained by
that time. Also, it might be argued that the present statute's
attempt to imply an intent to abandon prior water rights is un-
reasonable.
It is proposed that since there does not seem to be a pressing
water shortage at the present time and since this seems to point
to the conclusion that the regulatory effects of the North Dakota
statutes are directed towards the future conservation of water,
there is little need to effect a statutory system which may have
the harsh results of divesting existing water users of their rights
to use the water in the manner in which they have in the past as
long as such use is not wasteful.
It is admitted that everyone is presumed to know the law and
34. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter. 209 U.S. 349 (1908) ; Baumann v. Smrha,
supra note 20; Knight v. Grimes, supra note 29; State v. Finney, 65 Idaho 630, 150
P.2d 130 (1944).
35. Reinran v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) ; City of Des Moines v.
Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823 (1921) ; State v. Klein, 63 N.D. 514,
249 N.W. 118 (1933) ; City of Bismarck v. Hughes, 53 N.D. 838, 208 N.W. 711 (1926).
36. Cf. State v. Cromwell, 72 N.D. 565, 9 N.W.2d 914 (1943).
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that ignorance and passiveness are no excuse for non-compliance.
But it is arguable that the present statutory scheme places an un-
reasonable burden upon owners of prior rights. In the last instance,
while it is probable that Section 61-04-22 of the North Dakota
Century Code is unconstitutional if the tests which the Kansas and
South Dakota Courts have set forth are applied, it is possible that
the North Dakota Courts may uphold the statute. If this should
happen, one may ponder to what extent the police power may be
used and to what extent the historic sense of property rights has
become subject to legislative prerogative.
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